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NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S. I's "NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMATION" PROVISIONS
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press
the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.

The Govern-

ment's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would
remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people.'

Congress is presently debating the "Criminal Justice Reform Act of
1975" (the Act).2 The Act is an attempt to create a "systematic,
consistent, and comprehensive federal criminal code to replace the
hodgepodge that now exists."3 Included within its coverage are espionage and other related offenses. 4 Three of the eight sections dealing

with espionage have the potential to increase the power of the executive
branch to control the flow of news concerning the federal government.
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
2. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1]. An alternative bill
has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Kastenmeir, Edwards, and Mikva, H.R. 10580, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
3. SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDicRy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON C2IMINAL f'USncE CoDIFIcAON, REVISION AND REFORM ACr OF 1974, pt. 2, at 3-4 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter cited as JuDICIARY REPORT]. The attempt to create a new federal
criminal code began with a memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General
Ramsey Clark to Attorney General Robert Kennedy. In 1966, President Johnson introduced a proposal to establish a national commission to study and make recommendations
on a new criminal code. Congress then created the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws (the National Commission). Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of July 8, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat.
44. In 1971, the National Commission submitted its final report. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORm OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971) [hereinafter cited
as FiNAL REPORT]. The work of the National Commission was greatly influenced by
conservative forces in Congress and the White House. The result of this was the introduction of the Final Report in a far more conservative form. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st S.ess.
(1973) and S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Hearings were conducted, after which
the two bills were combined into one. S. 1, supra note 2. See Hearings on
S. 1, S. 716, & S. 1400, Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws & Procedures of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S. 1, S. 716, & S. 1400]; Hearings on S. I & S. 1400, Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws & Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973.) thereinafter cited as Hearingson S. 1 & S. 1400].
4. S. 1, supra note 2, §§ 1121-28.
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These sections and their possible effect on constitutional freedom of the

press are the focus of this Comment.
I.

Tim STATUTORY SCHEME
A.

The Offenses

The three sections which will be considered concern the obtaining,
communicating, and handling of national defense information.' These

sections are: espionage, section 1121;1 disclosing national defense information, section 1122;7 and mishandling national defense information,
section 1123.8
5. "'[N]ational defense information' includes information, other than information
that has previously been made available to the public pursuant to authority of Congress or by the lawful act of a public servant, that relates to:
"(1) military capability of the United States or of an associate nation;
"(2) military planning or operations of the United States;
"(3) military communications of the United States;
"(4) military installations of the United States;
"(5) military weaponry, weapons development, or weapons research of the
United States;
"(6) intelligence operations, activities, plans, estimates, analyses, sources, or
methods, of the United States;
"(7) intelligence with regard to a foreign power;
"(8) communications intelligence information or cryptographic information;
"(9) restricted data as defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2014)... ..
S. 1, supranote 2, § 1128(f).
6. ,'Espionage
(a) O1TENsE.-A person is guilty of an offense, if, knowing that national defense information may be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the
United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power, he:
"(1) communicates such information to a foreign power;
"(2) obtains or collects such information, knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign power; or
"(3) enters a restricted area with intent to obtain or collect such information,
knowing that it may be communicated to a foreign power. .. .
Id. § 1121.
7. "Disclosing National Defense Information
"(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if, knowing that national defense
information may be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United
States, or to the advantage of a foreign power, he communicates such information
to a person who he knows is not authorized to receive it.
"
Id. § 1122.
8. 'Mishandling National Defense Information
"(a) OmN sE.-A person is guilty of an offense if:
"(1) being in authorized possession or control of national defense information,
he:
"(A) engages in conduct that causes its loss, destruction, or theft, or
its communication to a person who is not authorized to receive it;
"(B) fails to report promptly, to the agency authorizing him to possess
or control such information, its loss, destruction, or theft, or its communication to a person who is not authorized to receive it; or
"(C) intentionally fails to deliver it on demand to a federal public servant who is authorized to demand it. . ..
"(2) being in unauthorized possession or control of national defense information, he:
"(A) engages in conduct that causes its loss, destruction, or theft, or
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"Espionage" and "disclosing national defense information" prohibit
similar conduct, 9 and they have common elements. First, they both
require that the defendant know that the information "may be used to
the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or to the
advantage of a foreign power." Second, both offenses require that the
defendant's action involve communication; espionage requires that the
communication be made to a foreign power, and the offense of disclosing national defense information requires that the communication be
made to any person not authorized to receive it. The offense of "mishandling national defense information' makes it a crime to communicate such information to someone not authorized to receive it. This
section additionally makes criminal conduct that causes the loss, destruction, or theft of such information where no communication is involved.
Sections 1121 and 1122 generally have been designed to deter the unauthorized collection and disclosure of the nation's military secrets

which, if disclosed, would leave the country vulnerable to attack.' 0
More specifically, section 1121 is designed to prevent the entering of
restricted areas for purposes of spying for a foreign power, collecting

information for a foreign power, or communicating information to a foreign power." Section 1122 is designed to prevent the communication
its communication to another person who is not authorized to receive it;

or "(B) fails
to deliver it promptly to a federal public servant
who is en-

titled to receive it."
Id. § 1123.
9. See text following note 12 infra.
10. JuDIcmiAY REPORT, supranote 3, at 223.
With one exception, the proposed laws are largely reworkings of present espionage
statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1970). See also note 13 infra; text accompanying
notes 16-17 infra and accompanying text. The exception is section 1123(a) (2) (A)
which makes it a crime for a person in unauthorized possession of national defense information to engage in conduct that causes its loss, destruction, or theft. See note 8
supra; note 15 infra. The present law excepts this conduct from liability.
Of the sections intended to restate present law, there are, nevertheless, changes in language. For example, the phrase "information respecting the national defense," contained in section 793(a), and the phrase "information relating to the national defense,"
contained in section 794(a), are changed to "national defense information" in sections
1121(a), 1122, and 1123. For a discussion of the effect of this change see notes 4154 infra. Also, the phrase "is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation," as used in sections 793(a) and 794(a) (although the
latter section states "a foreign nation"), is changed to read "could be used to the
prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or advantage of a foreign power"
in sections 1121(a) and 1122. See text following note 93 infra.
11. tjpiviy 1PPOrT, supranote 3, at 232.,
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of information to anyone not entitled to receive it.1 2 This section is

almost identical to section 1121(a)(1).

The only difference is that

under section 1122 the communication may be to "any person" unau-

thorized to receive it whereas under section 1121(a)(1) the communication must be to "a foreign power." The proposed law is based on
the language of present federal criminal code sections 793(d) and
3

(e).o

Section 1123 is intended to prevent the loss, theft, or destruction of
national defense information through gross negligence and the failure to
report such loss.' 4 It is an attempt to combine parts of sections 793(d)
and (e) with section 793(f).11 Beyond expanding the type of acts
12. Id. at 237.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), (e) (1970). When the proposed statute was originally
drafted it failed to include the requirement found within section 793, that the individual
know the information could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage
of a foreign power. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1122 (1973). In the hearings on
the bill, this omission was criticized by several witnesses. See Hearings on S. I & S.
1400, supra note 3, at 5715-16 (statement of H. Florence); id. at 5748 (statement of R.
Jencks). The Judiciary Committee (the Committee) cited this criticism as the basis for
its inclusion of the knowledge provision when S. 1400 was reworked into S. 1. JuDICIA Y REPORT, supranote 3, at 238 n.53.
14. JuDicrARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 238.
15. Section 1123 (a) (2) (B) makes it criminal for someone in unauthorized possession
of national defense information to fail to promptly turn the information over to the Government. This is an expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1970) which makes criminal
the willful retention of such information by someone not entitled to possess it. Section
1123 has no requirement of willfulness.
The requirement that national defense information which is possessed without authorization be returned, raises a serious question of self-incrimination since the act of returning the information may require an admission of criminal conduct. While unauthorized
possession at the instant of possession is not illegal (provided it is not the result of an
illegal act), a further act of communication may be illegal under section 1123 (a) (2)
(A). See note 8 supra. Thus, for example, someone who finds and takes possession
of secret papers accidentally discarded has done nothing criminal. Returning them to
the Government would not place the individual in jeopardy. However, an editor who
requests a reporter to divulge national defense information, and a publisher who solicits
the information from the editor are both acting as accomplices to a violation of section
1123 (a) (2) (A). The reporter who encouraged the source to relate the information in
the first place also could be an accomplice under section 1123(a) (1) (A). To compel
these persons to return the information under penalty of law may violate fifth amendment guarantees against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), ruled that a
defendant engaging in the business of accepting wagers could not be convicted for failing to register and pay an occupational tax. Compliance with the law would have required the defendant
to provide information which he might reasonably suppose would be available to
prosecuting authorities and which would surely prove a significant "link in a chain"
of evidence tending to establish his guilt.
Id. at 48 (footnotes omitted). In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 8 (1969), the Su-
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constituting an offense for one in unauthorized possession of information, 16 a change has been made by the removal of the phrase "reason to
believe that [the information] could be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation!' and the term "willful-

ness" as elements7 of the offense involving communication of information
or its retention.'
B.

Effective Changes from PriorLaw

1. Communication
While the various sections are to some degree a re-enactment of

present law, S. l's use of the word "communicate" in sections 1121 and
1122 marks a significant change. S. 1 defines communication to mean

"to import or transfer information, or otherwise to make information

available by any means, to a person or to the general public."' 8 It was
intended that this definition should be considered to include publication
preme Court stated that "the aspect of the self-incrimination privilege which was involved in Marchetti ... is . . . the right not to be criminally liable for one's -previous
failure to obey a statute which required an incriminatory act." Id. at 28.
To the extent that section 1123 (a) (2) (B) puts a person in the position of choosing
between complying with the law or protecting himself from incrimination, failure to
comply should not be criminal.
16. The Committee believed that one in unauthorized possession of information
should be held to the same level of care as those in authorized possession who are liable
for loss, destruction, or theft. See JUDIcrARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 241-42.
17. There is a controversy whether, under present law, the "reason to believe" language modifies all the tangible objects listed in section 793(d) and (e), or merely information relating to the national defense. See note 25 infra. The United States Justice
Department has taken the view that only information relating to the national defense
is modified by this language. See Hearings on S. 1, S. 716, & S. 1400, supra note
3, at 5477 (statement of K. Maroney, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., Dept. of
Justice). The importance of this lies in the interpretation accorded the "reason to believe' language.
In the only judicial interpretation, the United States District Court in United States
v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 444 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), held that scienter was a necessary requirement
whether the information was tangible or intangible and that this requirement of scienter
sprang from the "belief language." Another view, held by Professors Schmidt and
Edgar of Columbia Law School is that while the Justice Department is correct regarding
the syntactical question, scienter is a requirement whether the information is tangible
or intangible because of the requirement that the acts be done willfully. Edgar &
Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 CoLUM.
L. Rnv. 929, 1038-46 (1973) Ihereinafter cited as Edgar & Schmidt]. If this is true,
the dropping of the word "willfully," takes on far greater significance than the loss of
the reason to believe language. In either case, all the language that would make scienter
an element of the offense has been removed.
18. S. 1, supra note 2, § 111.
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in a newspaper."0 Thus, substituting "publication" for "communication", sections 1121 (a) and 1122 may be read as one:
"A person is guilty of an offense if knowing that national defense information could be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the
United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power, he: (1) publishes the information in a newspaper; (2) obtains or collects such information, knowing that it may be published in a newspaper; or (3) enters
a restricted area with intent to obtain or collect such information, knowing that it may be published in a newspaper."
In contrast to S. 1, under present law there are two groups of
espionage offenses. One involves the communication of highly sensitive
20 The second involves
material and specifically applies to publishing.
the communication of a wide range of information under the rubric of
21
"national defense information," and may not apply to publishing. The
proposed law makes the broad definition in the latter, with some refinement, the general law and the specialized language of the former a
higher grade offense. Where previously the type of information involved determined whether publication could constitute an offense at all,
under the proposed law, since all types of information are included in
one statute clearly encompassing publication, the informational distinction is relevant only to determine the degree of the offense.
This reformulation of the espionage offenses was based on the Judiciary Committee's (the Committee) belief that the word "communicate!' as used in present law includes publication. The Committee
stated:
Although the district court in [the New York Times] case had ruled
that the language of the act did not include "publication,". . . this view
was rejected not only by Justice White, but also by Justices Stewart and
Blackmun and22by Chief Justice Burger. . . and was questioned by Justice Marshall.
But, contrary to the Committee's conclusion, this issue has not been
2
definitively decided. In New York Times v. United States," Justice
Douglas 24 stated, in dicta, that the statute under which the Government
sought to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg for publication of the Pentagon Pa19. JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 227 n.16.
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(b), 798 (1970).
21. Id. §§ 793(d)-(e), 794(a).
22. JuDicuRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 227 n.16 (citations omitted).
23. 403 U.S. 13 (1971).
24. 403 U.S. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black joined in Justice Douglas's opinion.
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pers, section 793 (e),25 bars only non-published communication of in-

formation.26 Of the present eight sections in the chapter on espionage
and censorship, 27 Justice Douglas noted, three specifically bar both communication and publication.2 8 Therefore, he concluded, "it is apparent

that Congress was capable of and did distinguish between publishing
and communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act.' 2 9 By

contrasting section 793(e) with those sections using the word "publish,"
Douglas gave tacit acknowledgement that only these sections containing

the word "publish" would prohibit publication of the prescribed information by a newspaper.
Justice White was more direct in stating that newspapers have no
blanket immunity from prosecution." The first sections he discussed,
sections 797 and 798, both specifically prohibit "publishing' and are
the same sections that Douglas intimated might be the basis for criminal
liability. However, Justice White distinguished his position from that of
Justice Douglas when he proceeded to raise the spectre of section
25. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (e)(1970) provides:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national
defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to
the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or
causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate,
deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same
to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to
deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it ....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.
26. 403 U.S. at 720.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-99 (1970).
28. Section 794(b) applies to "whoever in time of war with intent that the same shall
be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates" information regarding the disposition of armed forces. Id. § 794(b) (emphasis added).
Section 797 applies to one who "reproduces, publishes, sells or gives away" photographs of defense installations. Id. § 797 (emphasis added).
29. 403 U.S. at 721. Justice Douglas also quoted a rejected version of section 793
which twice referred to both publication and communication. He quoted the full text
of the rejected bill:
"During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United States
is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by proclamation, ...
prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense which, in his judgment,
is of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy."
Id. at 720-21, quoting 55 CONG. REc. 1763 (1917). The bill was rejected on the ground
that it violated the first amendment and gave excessive power to the President. See 55
CONG. R c. 1808-16 (1917).
30. 403 U.S. at 733 (White, J., concurring).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

793(e). He noted that liability could arise when an unauthorized
possessor of a document relating to the national defense either communicated the document or willfully retained it.81 In a footnote he went
on to state:
[From the face of subsection (e) and from the content of the act of
which it was a part, it seems undeniable that a newspaper.. .[is] vulnerable to prosecution under § 793(e) if they communicate or withhold
the materials covered by the section. The District Court ruled that "communication" did not reach publication by a newspaper of documents
relating to the national defense. I intimate no views on the correctness
2
of that conclusion.

Justice White, therefore refused to speculate on anything but the retention and non-publication communication aspects of section 793 (e). At
best, then, the contrast between the firm belief of Justice Douglas, that
the use of the word communicate does not include publication, and Justice White's indecision highlights the less than clear evidence of legislative intent.
The Committee did not rely solely on the New York Times case, but
also relied on Congressman Shirley's opinion, given in the debate over
the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917, that the word "communicate" is broader in meaning than the word "publish."3 But Mr. Shirley went on to state that "'communicate' would seem to embrace any
communication, whether it led to or was intended to lead to publication." 4 This language seems to indicate that communication can lead
to, but may be just short of publication. Other remarks during the debate support this theory. 5 While some support can be found
for the
7
inconclusive.3
is
result
overall
the
conclusion,"'
Committee's
31. Id. at 740. See note 25 supra.
32. Id. at 739 n.9 (emphasis added). The remarks of the Chief Justice and Justices
Stewart and Blackmun, which were cited by the Committee as rejecting the district court
decision in New York Times, were actually in concurrence with Justice White's opinion,
or lack thereof, concerning liability for publication.
33. JunicuRxY REPORT, supra note 3, at 227, citing 55 CONG. REc. 1716 (1917) (statement of Congressman Shirley).
34. 55 CoNG. REc. 1716 (1917).
35. As it stands, it states that it shall be unlawful to publish or communicate-communicate from person to person-any information relating to the national defense.
Id. at 1777 (statement of Congressman Norton).
36. Thus, during the House debates on the Espionage Act, it was stated:
There ought to be some restrictions upon the publication of those things concerning
the vital interests of our national defense and which if communicated to the enemy
by such publication would be detrimental to our defense.
Id. at 1810 (statement of Congressman Webb).
37. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 1032-38. The authors argue that no distinction should be found between the meaning of "publication" and "communication."
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To support its conclusion that the present laws encompasses publica-

tion, the Committee additionally noted:
The intent of the Congress also appears from the inclusion in the same
Act of a provision, now appearing as 18 U.S.C. 1717, declaring as nonmailable "every. . . newspaper, pamphlet, book or other publication
. .. in violation of sections . . . 793 [or] 7942"38
This, however, is a serious misstatement of the language of the law.

Section 1717 provides that various types of material may violate various
other laws, and are therefore unmailable. The materials listed therein
do not individually fall within the purview of each of the enumerated

laws.89 For example, aside from newspapers there still remain materials
listed which physically could be transported by mail and which could

violate section 793 and 794(a) (the two sections containing the word
"communicate").

And without the listing of section 793 there are
other laws listed which a newspaper could violate and therefore would be

unmailable.40 Thus, the inclusion of newspapers as one type of material subject to section 1717 and the listing of sections 793 and 794(a) as

laws invoking the sanctions of section 1717 do not evince a congressional intent that "communication" includes publication.
2. National Defense Information
All three sections concern national defense information as defined

within section 1128, but this definition is excessively broad. At one end
of the spectrum of "information" is very precise language of what is to
be covered. 41 At the other end of the spectrum is language such as:
But they still maintain that the present law exempts any act of publication from criminal
sanctions so long as the conduct was undertaken for any reason that reflects interests
protected by the first amendment. Id. at 1046. This result is required by a constitutionally supportable reading of the word "willfully" in sections 793 (d) and (e).
38. JuDIcuRy REPORT, supranote 3, at 227 n.16, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970).
39. For instance, it is hard to see how a newspaper could be in violation of section
964 which outlaws the equipping and sending out of a vessel of war to a belligerent nation while the United States is a neutral. 18 U.S.C. § 964 (1970).
40. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1970) has been held to be applicable to newspapers. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1918).
41. This includes information directly concerning military spacecraft or satellites,
early warning systems or other means of defense or retaliation against large scale attack,
war plans, communications intelligence or cryptographic information. S. 1, supra note
2, § 1121 (b) (1) (B). The definitions of relevant terms are as follows:
"'[Communications intelligence information' means information:
"(1) regarding a procedure or method used by the United States or a foreign
power in the interception of communications or the obtaining of information
from such communications by other than the intended recipient;
"(2) regarding the use, design, construction, maintenance, or repair of a device
or apparatus used, or prepared or planned for use by the United States or a for-
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"information that relates to the military capability of the United States
or of an associate nation;" or "military planning or operations of the
United States;" or "military installations of the United States;" or "intelligence operations.

. .

or activities of the United States. 42 None of

these phrases have been defined or limited in meaning anywhere in S.
1, or in the Committee's report, and when considered in the aggregate
they seem to cover as much as is presently covered under existing law.
In its comment on the proposed law, the Committee stated that it
believed national defense information had been given an extensive defi-

nition in section 1128. 43 Moreover, the Committee noted that national
defense information was defined by the Supreme Court in Gorin v.
United States,44 wherein the Court agreed with the Government that
national defense " 'is a generic concept of broad connotations, referring
to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of

national preparedness.' ,,455

Judge Learned Hand refined the scope of

eign power in the interception of communications or the obtaining of information
from such communications by other than the intended recipient; or
"(3) obtained by use of a procedure or method described in paragraph (1),
or by use of a device or apparatus described in paragraph (2); .
Id. § 1128(c).
"'[C]ryptographic information' means information:
"(1) regarding the nature, preparation, use, or interpretation of a code, cipher,
cryptographic system, or other method of any nature used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents or significance or means of communications
of the United States or a foreign power;
"(2) regarding the use, design, construction, maintenance, or repair of a device
or apparatus used, or prepared or planned for use, for cryptographic purposes, by
the United States or a foreign power; or
"(3) obtained by interpreting an original communication by the United States
or a foreign power that was in the form of a code or cipher or that was transmitted by means of a cryptographic system or other method of any nature used
for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents or significance or means
of communications of the United States or a foreign power; ...
"
Id. § 1128(d).
42. S. 1, supra note 2, §§ 1128(f)(1), (2), (4)-(6). The Committee noted that
the enumerated subparagraphs of section 1128(f) are only some of the types of information covered in the current law. There is no mention, however, that the new law will
be limited to the subparagraphs, and the language in section 1128 provides no evidence
that a narrowing is intended. The language defining national security information in
the Final Report stated: "National security information means information regarding:
.... " FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 86 (emphasis added). This language would
seem to limit the meaning to the listed items. S. 1, however, uses the language: "national defense information includes information that relates to: . . . ." S. 1, supra note
2, § 1128(f) (emphasis added). The word "includes" would seem to be a non-limiting
word.
43. JuDicrARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 234.
44. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
45. Id. at 28. Gorin, a Soviet citizen, paid a man who worked for the Office of Naval
Intelligence in Southern California to pass on to him the substance of counterintelligence
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present law when he construed it as excluding national defense information already made available to the public.4"

The Committee further stated that the abstract definition found in
Gorin had been made more concrete by the inclusion of specific examples.

Nonetheless, all of the following stories could fall within the

definition of national defense information as it now stands: the unau-

thorized air raids on North Vietnam by Air Force General LaValle4 7
and the massacre at My Lai, 45 both dealing with information that re-

lates to the military operations of the United States; the systematic torture of Marine prisoners at the Camp Pendleton Brig, 49 dealing with

reports concerning Japanese in the area. The reports that were considered to relate to
the national defense consisted of
a relation of the movements of certain Japanese from one place to another, and
None
activities thereof, such as photography, conferences, and other matters ....
of the reports contained any information regarding the army, the navy, any part
thereof, their equipment, munitions, supplies or aircraft or anything pertaining
Most of them, on their face, appear innocuous, there being no way
thereto ....
to connect them with other material which the Naval Intelligence may have, so that
the importance of the records does not appear.
Gorin v. United States, 111 F.2d 712, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1940), affd, 312 U.S. 19 (1941);
see Juicrsx RPPOT, supra note 3, at 234.
46. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1972, at 4, col. 4. General LaValle had ordered his pilots
to attack targets in North Vietnam from January to March, 1972, exceeding what was
then allowed. The airstrikes were falsely reported as defensive measures. When this
information was first made public by the New York Times it had not been officially
released. The news story quoted unnamed, well informed military and congressional
sources. It was only on the following day that the Air Force officially announced that
the unauthorized raids had been falsified. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1. The
Air Force tacitly acknowledged that the information had still been secret at the time
of its disclosure by admitting that the falsified reports were still classified. Id. at 6,
col. 2.
48. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath, HARPERS, May,
1970, at 53. In My Lai, a village in South Vietnam, in March, 1968, United States
soldiers shot at least one hundred unarmed civilians. The first official version of the
incident reported that two companies of the Americal Division had caught a North Vietnamese unit in a pincer movement, killing 128 enemy soliders. There was no mention
of civilian casualties. Id. at 72. After the Pentagon became aware of the massacre and
decided to prosecute Lt William Calley for the murder of 109 civilians, the Government
still tried to keep the details of the story secret. After the issuance of a press release
stating only that Lt. Calley would be prosecuted for the murder of civilians in Vietnam,
the Pentagon refused to give any further information to reporters. Id. at 82. Also, on
October 13, 1969, a month after the press release announcing the trial, the Pentagon
contacted Ronald Ridenhour, the former soldier whose letter to Congressman Udall had
prompted the investigation. In the letter to Ridenhour the Army stated, "It is not appropriate to report details of the allegations to news media. Your continued cooperation
in this matter is acknowledged." Id. at 83. It was only after Hersh was able to find
Calley that the public found out what happened at My Lai.
49. Sherrill, Pendleton, Brig: Andersonville-by-the-Sea, 209 NATION 239 (1969).
Sherrill disclosed that during 1969 prisoners in the marine camp brig were being sub-
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information that relates to military installations of the United States;
and various reports concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (one
of the most recent being its secret funding of political parties in Italy), 0
dealing with information that relates to intelligence operations of the
United States. For these stories to come within the definition of national defense information all that is required is for the Government
to have tried to keep the information secret." At some point in each
of these stories this was the case.
Sections 1121 and 1122 attempt to narrow the information covered
by requiring that it "may be used to the prejudice of the safety or
interest of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign power."

But, at best, this is only a half-hearted attempt; in all likelihood it would
still allow the stories referred to, to come within the statute. The pres-

ent law requires that the information is to be used against the United
States or for the foreign government. 52 Any editor, no matter how patriotic his motives in publishing information shedding light on the misjected to both physical and mental abuse bordering on torture. In the course of the article, Sherrill quoted from a memorandum marked, "for official eyes only," sent from the
Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps to the Marine Chief of Staff. The report
contained information directly related to a military installation.
"The camp was described by one officer as looking like Andersonville (an infamous prisoner-of-war camp holding Union soldiers during the Civil War). . ..
The 1942 vintage building being utilized for all newly confined prisoners . . . is
a fire and safety hazard. In two areas tents are being used for confinement . . .
and the tents are extremely overcrowded, the average footage per man in these tents
is about 25 square feet. The standard square footage is 75 square feet per man.
Id. at 240. The report also made clear that this information was to be kept secret:
"'[A] public disclosure of existing conditions could tend to place the Commandant in
an embarrassing defensive position.'" Id. at 239.
50. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1976, at 1, col. 8. In an article by Seymour Hersh, the paper
reported that the CIA, beginning on December 8, 1975, had given over six million dollars in secret payments to anti-communist politicians in Italy. The information came
to the paper through unrevealed sources. That the information was supposed to be
secret can be seen by President Ford's reaction to the story. The day after release of
the story it was reported that:
President Ford was described as being "angry" about published reports that the
Central Intelligence Agency had been funnelling money to anti-communist politicians in Italy....
Such reports, [the President] said, "undermine our capability to carry out foreign
policy. ...

"

Id., January 15, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
51. There is no attempt to set a minimum standard of effort on the part of the Government necessary to remove information from the public domain and make it secret.
The Committee believed this should be left to judicial development. JuDicrAY RFPORT,
supra note 3, at 233. The probable effect of this is that the least amount of effort as
will be judicially accepted will become the standard causing the law to reach its broadest
potential.
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)-(c), 794 (1970).
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deeds of this country, would have to acknowledge that the information
may be used to the advantage of a foreign power for propaganda purposes if nothing else.55
The above examples are within the purview of S. 1, specifically section 1123, because that section has no scienter requirement. All that

is required is communication (publication) of the specified information
to someone unauthorized to receive it (the public).

Furthermore, the

act of preparing these stories necessitated the receipt of the information.
This means the reporter may have acted as an accomplice to the unauthorized communication of the information in violation of section 1123

(a)(1)(A)5 4 or the reporter may have violated section 1123(a)(2)
(B) by not promptly returning the information to the Government.
"I.

FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Because freedom of the press is guaranteed by the first amendment to
the Constitution, any law that would make criminal the publication of
information in a newspaper is subject to constitutional scrutiny. As
stated by Justice Murphy:
A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its preservation is
essential to the survival of liberty. Any inroad made upon the constitutional protection of a free press tends to undermine the freedom of all
men to print and to read the truth. 55
Freedom of the press, however, is not absolute. The basic test is
whether activities prohibited will cause a serious and imminent threat to
53. The propaganda value in the examples given above (notes 47-50 supra) is obvious.
This value is even more obvious given that section 1121 refers to foreign power, not
foreign nation. Foreign power has been defined to include:
"(a) foreign government, faction, party, or military force, or persons purporting to
act as such, whether or not recognized by the United States; and (b) an international organization."
S. 1, supra note 2, § 111. This definition would possibly include the minority political
parties of every nation of the world, Amnesty International, and the International Red
Cross.
54. Given the argument that national defense information is still as broad as the
standard allowed in Gorin (see JuDicmRy REPORT, supra note 3, at 238; note 42 supra
and accompanying text), Hersh's description of how he found Lt. Calley is enlightening.
After asking a soldier for Calley's address the soldier replied:
"The only thing I know is that we've got his [Calley's] personnel file in there. I'd
have to steal it out of there." There is a long pause. "Come on," I tell him ....
He says: "Well, wait here." And he goes in. He goes in past the old sergeant
and comes out a couple minutes later. We get back inside the car. He reaches
inside his shirt and pulls out a file marked, "Calley, William L., Jr."
Eszterhas, The Reporter Who Broke the My Lai Massacre, the Secret Bombing of Cambodia and the CIA Domestic Spying Stories, Rolling Stone, April 10, 1975, at 78, col.
2.
55. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

a governmental interest worthy of protection. The Supreme Court has

held a variety of state interests to be sufficient to allow limitation of the
rights of the press. Among these interests are the need for public
safety,5 6 the need for the orderly administration of prisons,57 and the

need for fair administration of justice.5" Related to this last interest are
a defendant's right to a fair trial and a grand jury's need for all information relevant to a criminal investigation.60
A recent dramatic case demonstrates the non-absolute nature of
freedom of the press. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,61 Justice

Blackmun (sitting as a circuit court judge) narrowed a broadly drawn
gag order to allow limited censorship of the press in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial. The Justice stated:
Most of our cases protecting the press from restrictions on what they
may report concern the trial phase of the criminal prosecution, a time
when the jurors and witnesses can be othenvise shielded from prejudicial

publicity....
I . . . conclude that certain facts that strongly implicate an accused may be restrained from publication by the media prior to his
trial.62
56. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
57. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (where information on
prison conditions available from sources other than face-to-face interviews of designated
inmates, denial of such interview does not violate freedom of press); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974) (where inmates have alternate channels of communication, regulation prohibiting face-to-face interview does not deny prisoner's rights).
58. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
59. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
The Court, in balancing the defendant's rights against those of the press, has referred
to a fair trial as "the most fundamental of all freedoms." Id. at 540.
60. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court believed that the importance of the grand jury in determining if there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and in protecting people against unfounded criminal prosecution necessitates a broad investigative power, overriding the claimed privilege of newspapers for protection of their sources. Id. at 690-91.
61. 96 S. Ct. 251 (1975).
62. Id. at 255. After Justice Blackmun's ruling, the Nebraska Supreme Court limited
censorship to events which had occurred prior to the opinion consisting of:
(1) Confessions or admissions against interests made by the accused to law enforcement officials. (2) Confessions or admissions against interest, oral or written,
if any, made by the accused to representatives of the news media. (3) Other information strongly implicative of the accused as the perpetrator of the slayings.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 18 Cim. L. REP. 2254, 2255 (Neb. Sup. Ct., Dec. 1,
1975).
The importance accorded criminal rights in relation to freedom of the press is also
underscored by the unwillingness of the courts to extend to civil actions the ruling of
Branzburg v. Hayes (see note 60 supra), requiring disclosure of confidential news
sources. See Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Democratic
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Given the position which the first amendment freedom of the press is
accorded in our constitutional hierarchy, it is possible that rights of the
press can be subordinated to the Government's national security interest. In United States v. Nixon 63 the Supreme Court noted that even
the need for information in a criminal trial might not be sufficient to
force disclosure of military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets.6 4 If the rights of the press must sometimes be subordinated to
those of the courts, and the courts must bow to the needs of national

security, it would seem that national security interests can be made superior to the press."'
A.

NationalSecurity as a GovernmentalInterest

On the federal level the need for national security for many years

has been a potent leveler of other constitutional freedoms.

In Schenck

v. United States,66 Justice Holmes stated, "When a nation is at war

many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to
its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight
S.. .67 The test to be used, he continued,
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
68
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.

Thus, the advocating of draft resistance to potential inductees during
World War I, whether by speech, pamphlet, or newspaper, was held to

constitute such a danger and Schenck was convicted.69 Although the
Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973). As the Baker court stated:
[S]urely in civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure.
470 F.2d at 785.
63. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
64. Id. at 706.
65. In Nixon, the Court implied that national security information could be withheld
even from "in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be
obliged to provide." Id. at 706. Compare such exposure with that resulting from
publication in one of the country's widest circulating newspapers.

66. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67. Id. at 52.
68. Id.
69. See also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), which upheld the conviction of a newspaper publisher of a German-American newspaper for attempting to
cause disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces. "[l]t
is impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper
was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame ... ." Id.
at 209. In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920), the Supreme Court upheld
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danger language was an impressive standard for the Government to
meet, the Court found that it had been met with great frequency. 70 The
Government's success was such that one commentator has reflected:
In examining the Court's record in the national security area, one
seeks in vain to find a single case in which press freedom has been asserted successfully against a national security claim interposed by the
government until the New York Times decision. 71
There is no question that the Government has a legitimate interest in
preserving the nation's security and that such an interest may justify
curtailing civil liberties. Beginning in the 1960's, however, the Supreme Court became less willing to let national defense interests curtail fundamental rights. The Court began to require very specific, narrowly drawn statutes to prohibit conduct protected by the first amendment.
In United States v. Robel,72 the Court held unconstitutional a statute
that made it a crime to work in a defense plant while being a member of
the Communist Party. The statute was found to be overly broad in its
restriction of the right of association guaranteed by the first amendment.
Chief Justice Warren, while recognizing the Government's right to
safeguard its vital interests,78 stated that "'[p]recision of regulation
must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms.'-7" Concurring, Justice 'Brennan wrote, "The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation invokes
criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights. .... ,,75
In United States v. United States District Court7" the Court found
that the national security interest in engaging in wiretapping beyond
that allowed by the confines of a narrowly drawn statute, could not take
precedence over the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas noted that
a conviction against the officers of a German-American newspaper for publishing false
reports and dispatches with the intent to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service
of the United States.
70. Justice Holmes often dissented from such findings. See, e.g., Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, Holmes, J.J., dissenting); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Rubins, Foreign Policy, Secrecy, and the First Amendment: The Pentagon Papers
in Retrospect, 17 How. LJ. 578, 592 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rubins].
72. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
73. rd. at 267.
74. Id. at 265, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
75. Id. at 275.
76. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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even though domestic security was involved, the case was not removed
from the mainstream of fourth amendment law. Rather, the fourth
amendment grew out of a colonial abhorrence for writs of assistance
which had been issued for reasons of domestic security."7 An analogy
can be drawn to the origins of freedom of the press in the trial of John
Peter Zenger for seditious libel causing discord in the domestic tran78
quility.
B.

NationalSecurity as a Sufficient Interest to Abridge
FirstAmendment Rights.

Unfortunately, there is no Supreme Court case deciding when publication of information by a newspaper is a sufficient threat to the
national security so that criminal sanctions against such publication will
be upheld as constitutional. 79 Even though there is a legitimate argument for enacting a statute imposing such sanctions, in view of the
Court's efforts to limit the reach of national security, all three sections,
1121-23, would seem unconstitutionally overbroad, and section 1123
would also seem unconstitutionally vague.
1.

Overbreadth

Since the defendant in Gorin never claimed a violation of first amendment rights, the Court never dealt with the question of overbreadth in
the statutory language.8 0 That issue should be reached under sections
1121, 1122, and 1123. The Supreme Court has stated:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
81
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
77. Id. at 327.

78. See generally J. ALExANDER, A
(2d ed. 1972).

BRmF NAnRArlvE OF TE CASE AND TRMAL OF JOHN

PETm ZENGER

79. This issue could have been decided if the charges against Daniel Ellsberg had not
been dismissed due to government misconduct, or the Supreme Court had not refused
to reach the issue in New York Times. See Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free
Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. Rv. 311 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nimmer].
80. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text; notes '84-86 infra and accompany-

ig text.
81. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted). The Supreme
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) stated:
A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be "overbroad" if in its reach
it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.
Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
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The governmental interest in maintaining secrecy is to keep intact the
nation's ability to be prepared for and to withstand any threats to the
nation's existence."2 It is axiomatic that if the nation does not survive,
all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution perish. The interests that
must be balanced against this governmental interest in secrecy are the
right of the press to inform the public and the public's interest to be
informed so that it can intelligently involve itself in the major issues of
the day. As Justice Douglas has written, "[t]he right to know is crucial
to the governing powers of the people. . ..
'8 3

Knowledge is essential to

informed decisions.
Specifically, since section 1123 is expressly applicable to the press
and affects its rights under the first amendment to both publish and
gather information, 84 overbreadth is an issue that must be reached.
There are innumerable documents and much information that may
come within the meaning of national defense information as used in
section 1123, the exposure of which could present little or no threat
to the country's collective security, much less a serious and imminent
threat.8 5 By making criminal the communication of such information,
the statute "sweeps within its prohibition"'8 activities protected by the
first amendment activities which the Government has no compelling reason to prohibit. For this reason section 1123 is unconstitutionally over87
broad.
Sections 1121 and 1122 prohibit a narrower group of activities than
those prohibited by section 1123; nevertheless, they should also be
found unconstitutionally overbroad. This overbreadth stems precisely
from the language which seemingly limits the conduct to which these
82. See note 71 supra.
83. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. Developments in the Lmv-National Security, 85 Hv. L. REv. 1130 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
[1]ntelligent public discussion of such issues is virtually impossible when, as often
happens, the basic facts necessary for an informed judgment are classified, with the
result that the public may not even be aware of the policy options open to the Government.
Id. at 1216.
84. See generally Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLuM.
L. Rnv. 838 (1971).
85. See notes 47-50 supra;Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
86. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); see id. at 115-17.
87. If publication would not pose a serious enough threat to justify punishment, the
retention of the information, if necessary for the preparation of the story, should likewise not be punishable. See Developments, supra note 83, at 1238-39 for a criticism
of Justice White's opinion regarding retention in New York Times. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
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sections are applicable: the actor must know that the information may
be used to "the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States or
to the advantage of a foreign power." This "knowing" provision, when
discussed in terms of the press, is so all encompassing as to be no
limitation at all.
The "prejudice to the United States" standard is also an insufficient
standard of injury. It must be recognized that as to information which
could be used to the prejudice of the United States, this country has
many interests-the soundness of its political institutions, its ability to
conduct foreign affairs, and safety in its streets. A story such as the one
uncovering Central Intelligence Agency payoffs in Italy', might have a
prejudicial effect on the nation's ability to engage successfully in foreign
affairs. But by informing the citizenry of what a Government is
doing in its name, the people are better able to judge whether such a
government should remain its representative. Such a story therefore
proves a benefit to our political institutions. S. 1 does not acknowledge
or in anyway accommodate this beneficial consideration.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 9 the Supreme Court, although
upholding the right of Congress to pass legislation to provide for thd
national security,90 held unconstitutional the application to members of
the Communist Party a prohibition on travel outside the country. The
Court's holding was based, in part, upon the fact that the prohibition

excluded "plainly relevant considerations" as to whether the travel
would affect the interest Congress sought to protect.9 1 Likewise, sections 1121 and 1122 fail to provide explicit provisions mandating that
countervailing considerations to governmental interests be taken into
account.
Moreover, the "prejudice" standard creates an insufficient standard
both as to imminence or likelihood. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 92 a case
involving the right of a state to infringe upon first amendment rights for
the purpose of protecting the public order, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law

violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or to produce such action.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See note 50 supra.
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 514.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly in-

trudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.9"
Whereas present law requires that the information "is to be used," S. 1
requires only that it "may be used." Thus, S. 1 presents a broadening
of present law, one which fails to limit the abridgment of first amendment rights to those situations where there is an imminent threat.
A final problem with the "prejudice" standard is the seriousness of
the injury that the United States must suffer. If the statute were
regulating conduct not constitutionally protected, the prohibition based
on prejudice to the state might be sufficient. But, in the words of
Justice Brandeis:
Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that
it would be inappropriate as the means of averting a rather trivial harm
to society. .

.

. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence

or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the State. 94
The concept of "advantage to a foreign power" raises the further
question of whether a law can constitutionally abridge the exercise of the
freedom of the press without a requirement that any injury to the state
occur.9 5 This provision, referring to the advantage of a foreign power,
was deleted by the National Commission without explanation. 0 The
Committee reinstated the language on the ground that it was upheld in
Gorin.9 7 But, as noted previously, Gorin did not reach the issue of
infringement on the first amendment. Additionally, the coverage of this
provision is expanded because of the change from "intent that it is to be
used" to "knowing that it may be used."
In this context, the stories concerning My Lai"' and the air raids of
General LaVale99 may have been, and probably were, of great value to
the North Vietnamese in their effort to influence world opinion. But
these stories also served a vital interest of Americans, i.e., making clear
the full scope of activity engaged in during the Vietnam war. Without
93. Id. at 447-48 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
94. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Nimmer, supra note
79, at 331.
95. See Nimmer, supra note 79, at 330.
96. FINtAL REPORT, supra note 3, § 1112.
97. JUDiciARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 234; see Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19,
29-30 (1941).
98. See note 48 supra.
99. See note 47 supra.
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such knowledge it would be difficult for the public to decide whether
or not to support the war effort. Since the definition of foreign power
includes the political parties of foreign governments, 10° the scope of
sections 1121 and 1122 is greatly broadened. Thus, the report on CIA
activity would fall within these sections because the information concerning payoffs to certain parties in Italy' 01 was of great benefit to those
political parties not involved. At the same time, this story was significant in informing the American public of the extent of CIA activities.
However, since the language of sections 1121 and 1122 is drawn in
the disjunctive, criminal liability would still attach for the publication of
these stories. So long as the foreign power is benefited, the gain to the
United States is unimportant. 10 2 This clearly is at odds with language
the Supreme Court has used when ruling on the abridgment of the first
amendment. 10 3 If "prejudice of the safety. . . of the United States" is
an insufficient standard of injury, a lack of injury at all must clearly fail.
These statutes, unconstitutionally overbroad on their face, cannot be
saved by judicial construction. The Supreme court in Aptheker stated:
It must be remembered that "[alithough this Court will often strain to
construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must
not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a
1
statute. .. " or judicially rewriting it. 04
The Committee has stated that sections 1121 and 1122 carry forth the
provisions of section 793(a)-(c) and (d)-(e) respectively. 0 5 In givings its opinion of the purpose of these present laws, the Committee
commented that
subsections (c) through (f) [of section 793] . . . are principally prophylactic measures, aimed at deterring conduct which might expose
100. S. 1, supra note 2, § 111; see note 54 supra.
101. See note 50 supra.
102. Cf. 40 Op. Arr'y GEN. 247 (1942), where the transference of defense information to allies under Lend-Lease was ruled not to violate the espionage laws because "the
primary advantage sought is that of the United States." The difference there was that
the information was transferred in order for the receiving nation to confer the benefit
back to the United States. In a situation like Vietnam, there is no intention on the part
of the foreign power to confer a benefit on the United States. In some cases the information may be used to the detriment of the United States. See also Edgar & Schmidt,
supra note 17, at 998.
103. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Craig v. Harney, 351 U.S. 367 (1947); text accompanying notes 55, 57, 89-93 supra.

104. 378 U.S. at 515, quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961).
105.

JUDICIARY RE]PORT,

supranote 3, at 232, 237.
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material to foreign eyes rather than against espionage on behalf of
foreigners.' 0
Given this broad intent, there appears to be no way in which a court
could construe the statute within constitutional limits and still do justice
to Congress' purpose in writing the law.
2.

Vagueness

As recently expressed by Justice Powell:
Mhe objection to vagueness, purely as a matter of due process .
rests in the possibility of discriminatory enforcement and in the unfairhave predicted that
ness of punishing a person who could not reasonably
107
the conduct in which he engaged was criminal.

The term "national defense information" is so vague as to what it does
or does not cover that a statute making criminal its communication, loss,
or destruction does not sufficiently make a person aware of what conduct is or is not criminal. Because section 1123 contains no scienter
requirement it fails for vagueness under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Gorin. There the Court ruled that as to the language "information
relating to the national defense":
[W]e find no uncertainty in this statute which deprives a person of the
ability to predetermine whether a contemplated action is criminal under
the provisions of this law. The obvious delimiting words in the statute
are those requiring "intent or reason to believe that the information to
be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
nation." This requires those prosecuted to
advantage of any foreign
10 8
have acted in bad faith.

Because both sections 1121 and 1122 modify the phrase "national
defense information" by requiring that the accused know the information "may be used to the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United
States or to the advantage of a foreign power," these sections would
appear to withstand constitutional scrutiny as to vagueness under Gorin.
Although the necessary state of mind in Gorin was intentional and
under S. 1 it is "knowing," "knowing" has been defined to mean that
the actor
106. Id. at 227.
107. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 449 n.15 (1975). The objection of vagueness is
even more critical when it touches on first amendment conduct.
[Where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
108. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941) (emphasis added).
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is aware of the nature of his conduct, he is aware or believes that requi-

site circumstances exist, or he is aware or believes that his conduct is
substantially certain to cause the result. 10 9

Thus, it would appear that the "knowing" language will be sufficient to
find that the person is put on notice.
Ill.

ACCOMMODATING THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS:

IN SEARCH OF A PERMISSIBLE CRIMINAL STANDARD

It has never been the intent of this Comment to claim that the
Government does not have a legitimate need for secrecy in some situations, or a concomitant right to insure that this secrecy is maintained.
In the words of Justice Clark, "'the life or liberty of any individual

should not be put in jeopardy because of actions of any news media'
.... "110 Likewise, the life of a nation should not be threatened. As
Chief Justice Burger has recently written:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are
not and ought not to be published to the world.""
The question then is what standard of harm will justify the imposition of

criminal sanctions against the press in order to protect national security."12 Although the New York Times case did not reach this issue, it

has generated a great deal of literature on the question.
In New York Times, the Court faced the issue of when a prior

restraint in the interests of national security might override a newspaper's constitutional right to publish. Justice Brennan argued that it
would require an allegation and proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already
at sea .... 113
109. JuDIcuIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 51.
110. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).

111. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), quoting C. & S. Air Lines
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 111 (1948).
112. Not all persons have suggested that this secrecy should be maintained by criminal sanctions. Ramsey Clark, former United States Attorney General, in an interview
with this author on January 26, 1976, expressed the opinion that criminal sanctions
against the press should never be imposed. During World War II there were no prosecutions despite the fact that an American newspaper once published damaging, secret information. Mr. Clark expressed the view that the espionage provisions in S. 1 and the
general desire to make criminal certain press activity were a reaction to the publication
of the Pentagon Papers and should not be enacted.
113. 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Any claim that the information "could" or "might" or "may" prejudice
the national interest would be implicitly rejected. Justice Stewart, in an
opinion joined by Justice White, would require direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to the nation before allowing imposition of a prior
restraint."" In his dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice Blackmun, agreed with the requirement of irreparable injury, but believed that this finding should be left to the executive and
respected by the judiciary. 11 5
Three of the Justices expressed a belief, however, that a second, less
restrictive standard should be employed for judging the criminality of a
publication. Based on the belief that the primary right guaranteed
under freedom of the press is the ability to publish, and not the ability to
avoid the consequences of the publication," 6 several Justices indicated
that a lesser standard could be used to justify post-publication criminal
sanctions. This argument proceeds from the fact that the imposition of
a prior restraint on publication is more restrictive of expression than
criminal sanctions. First, the injunction proceeding itself may delay
publication for several days during which time a disobedience by the
publisher of the injunction will be grounds for punishment, regardless
of the validity of the injunction. 1 7 Second, an injunction issues before
publication when the question of danger to national security is less
capable of being intelligently answered than at a post-publication criminal trial." 8
Noting the criticism of the application of different standards as
between prior restraints and criminal sanctions," 9 several commentators
114. Id. at 730 (White, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
740 (White, J., concurring).
117. Developments, supranote 83, at 1240.
118. Id. at 1241. See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 74852 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Underlying the argument favoring a different standard for criminal sanctions is
Blackstone's writing that:
"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published."
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 53 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), quoting 4 BLACKSTONe'S COMMENTAimS 151 (Cooley 4th ed. 1899).

This language was

criticized by Chief Justice Warren who noted:
There has been general criticism of the theory that Blackstone's statement was embodied in the First Amendment, the objection being "'that the mere exemption from
previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional provisions'; and
that 'the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the
phrase itself a by-word, if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he
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have argued that the Brennan-Stewart test of irreparable injury should
be applied in both situations. 2 ' The value of such a standard is that it
gives credence to the proposition in New York Times that a free flow of

information to the public is necessary in a democracy to check governmental power.'

However, a criminal statute apparently would not

have to meet as strict a test as was outlined by Brennan in order to be
upheld. Members of the Court in New York Times also made clear

that guidance from Congress on this issue would be respected.

22

An-

other commentator has suggested that the test to determine the validity
of a criminal statute should focus upon the intent of the publisher.

According to this approach, the first amendment would prohibit the
prosecution of a publisher absent a showing of some improper state of

mind in publishing information injurious to the national interest.

23

Whether one focuses upon the injury to the United States or the intent

of the publisher, it appears that in order to accommodate both the
national security interest and the Constitution any criminal statute
should be limited to guarding against the disclosure of specific informa-

tion of such a nature that the public's interest in receiving it is minimal
pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications."
Id. at 54. Warren's criticism has been further explained:
Warren was quoting Thomas Cooley's Comments on Blackstone in Constitutional Limitations (7 ed.) pp. 603, 604. Later in the same passage Cooley
states, "The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely but
any actions of the government by which means it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people
for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens."
Rubins, supranote 71, at 607 n.135.
Also critical of the distinction between prior restraint and criminal sanctions in a case
such as New York Times is Columbia Law Professor Louis Henkin, who wrote:
The distinction between prior injunction and subsequent punishment is hallowed by
history, but its application, at least here, would seem less than persuasive: while
a criminal penalty more -readily permits "civil disobedience," or reliance on the jury
to acquit, stiff penalties will deter-and deny the right to know-almost as effectively as any injunction.
Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon
Papers,120 U. PA. L. Rv. 271, 278 (1971).
120. See Developments, supra note 83, at 1242; Nimmer, supranote 79, at 333.
To be sure, some injury would result from such a standard, but the harm is more
than counterbalanced by the speech values enhanced. . . . [S]peech immunity in
this context is likely to carry with it a healthy criticism of government officials
whose activities could not otherwise be held up to the public light.
Id.
121. Developments, supranote 83, at 1241.
122. 403 U.S. at 730 (White, J., concurring). See Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Security" Decions: Which Interests are Being Protected?, 40 TmN. L.
REv. 1, 27 (1972); Developments, supra note 83, at 1242.
123. Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CALIn. L.
Rv. 108, 129-31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
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compared to the grave dangers to security or constitutional executive
privilege 24 that might result from disclosure.1 2 The alternative to S. 1,
H.R. 10850, attempts to formulate such a statute. The espionage
sections cover the communication of technical details of weaponry and
defensive military contingency plans in respect of foreign nations, if
such information, if obtained by a foreign government would be used to
injure significantly the national defense of the United States.120 Further, H.R. 10580's section 1121 requires that the defendant must intend
the information to be used by a foreign nation to the injury of the
national defense.127 S. 1, on the other hand, is totally inadequate in this
respect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The right of the press to disseminate information to the American
public is a constitutionally protected activity. The inclusion of publication of certain information as criminal activity in sections 1121, 1122,
and 1123 of S. 1 imposes the requirement that these sections be narrowly and specifically drawn in order to insure that they do not infringe on
the protected activity of the press. Unfortunately, the language of these
sections is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it may create criminal
liability for the publication of information that poses no threat to the
security of the United States, and may, in fact, be beneficial to the
interest of the public in insuring a representative government. Additionally, section 1123 is unconstitutionally vague in its failure to require
scienter as an element. Therefore, S. 1 should be rejected insofar as it
represents an impermissible expansion of espionage offenses.
However, since there are also several problems with the present
espionage laws,1 28 the effort for reform should not end with a rejection
of S. 1. Rather, Congress should attempt to draft a statute that would
permissibly accommodate the relevant interests. The Supreme Court has
124. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
125. Developments, supra note 83, at 1242.
126. I-R. 10580, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1121, 1124 (1975). This bill, however,
is subject to the same criticism as S. 1 in that there is no requirement of imminence
of injury. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
127. Thus, if the publisher's motive is to inform the public there would be no liability.
Katz, analogyzing to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
concluded that since the public in the interest of its well-being has a right to have certain information kept secret, if a publisher, with reckless disregard of that right, discloses the information such publisher should be subject to liability. Katz, supra note
123, at 131-32.
128. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 17, at 1076-87.
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provided some guidance on the issue in New York Times, and the
Congress has made some significant steps towards achieving a proper
statute in H.R. 10850. But when dealing with the writing of criminal
laws in such an important area, attention should be paid to former Chief
Justice Warren's remarks that:
[Tihis concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself,
justifying any exercise of the legislative power designed to promote such
a goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those values and ideas which set this Nation apart. .

.

. It would

indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
the subversion of those liberties. . . which make the defense of the Nation worthwhile.

1 29

Ronald Keith Silver

129. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (Warren, CJ.).

